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Abstract 
 
The competitive environment facing all industries has forced many organizations to choose strategies that 
enhance organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Reengineering is one of the tools used in 
administering productivity improvements, cost control and asset management.  This paper examines the 
reengineering process of a Higher Education Institution (HEI) in Malaysia. The impact of cost reduction 
strategies linked to the overall performance of the organization was discussed in terms of management 
system prior to restructuring; vision, mission and strategic direction; core business processes; financial 
performance analysis; corporate and organizational structure; reorganization of learning centers; courses 
offered; human resource policies and customers feedback. The data were gathered through an analysis of 
secondary data obtained from the HEI and interviews with 30 top and middle level managers from various 
departments. The study found that generally the HEI focused on the cost cutting strategy especially on cost 
of sales and operational expenses. Consequently the utilization of the learning centers increased from 49 
percent to 69 percent, the rate of occupancy of the learning centers increased from 49 percent to 69 percent, 
the number of home courses offered increased from 39 percent to 45 percent and the number of part time 
lectures was reduced tremendously. There were also marked improvements in academic networks and 
partnerships that provide for knowledge exchange and transfer. 
 
Keywords: Restructuring, business process reengineering and higher education institution 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Business process reengineering (BPR) according to Sethi and King (1998) is the redesigning and 
reorganizing of business activities as a consequence of questioning the status quo. It seeks to fulfill specific 
objectives and can lead to breakthrough improvements. It is often associated with significant cultural and 
technological changes. Organizational reengineering is based upon two interacting factors: total customer 
satisfaction and effective and efficient internal processes. The organization succeeds from the inside out 
approach: the commitment and dedication of employees to fulfill customer needs. Competing from the 
inside out means managing employees not merely to make them comfortable within a company, but 
managing them so that the firm can compete in the marketplace. Reengineering efforts usually have four 
major components: a greater focus on the customers of the organization; a fundamental rethinking of the 
process in the organization that leads to improvements in productivity and cycle time; a structural 
reorganization, typically breaking functional hierarchies into cross-functional teams and new information 
and measurement systems using the latest technology to drive improved data distribution and decision 
making. 
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Alavi and Yoo (1995) found that BPR involves redesigning key business processes in an attempt to 
improve performance in areas such as quality, speed and cost. The concept seeks to provide managers with 
a business model, which will reinvent their organization, creating one which has the potential to be flexible 
and competitive to the challenges of the environment. 
 
Grint and Wilcocks (1995), Devenport (1998) and Tang and Zairi (1998) defined the key elements of BPR 
as customer focus; an emphasis on designing and improving key organizational processes; fundamental 
change and critical success factors. 
 
McAdam and Bickerstaff (2001), found that colleges need to be much more customer focused, flexible and 
able to meet the individual needs of learners if they want to survive. BPR is considered to be a suitable 
vehicle to achieve these changes. The study suggested that colleges need to become more customer and 
business process focused. 
 
Leatt, Baker, Halverson and Aird (1997) identified the consequences of cost reduction strategies for an 
organization’s performance in terms of costs, quality of services and consumers and employees satisfaction.  
 
Gales (1994) found that drastic organizational change is driven by technological opportunity, but BPR 
represents not only improvement in education but also a total paradigm shift.   
 
In the effort to reengineer the key processes, the HEI established a framework for which the restructuring 
process will be based upon. The framework include:  
 
• All senior managers must be committed to the reengineering effort. The commitment must be 
sustained throughout the project. The project sponsor must be a senior level manager, preferably the 
President or the manager responsible for the process to be reengineered. 
 
• The managers must understand the problem and opportunities and set realistic BPR goals and 
objectives. 
 
• The HEI must empower employees with a collaborative work style both during and after a BPR 
project. 
 
• The company’s vision must be shared and communicated all the time. 
 
• The HEI must focus on reengineering operational processes which are the core business processes of 
the HEI instead of management processes. Management processes such as strategic planning; capital 
budgeting; financing; investing in IT; employee evaluation and reward process. 
 
• The employees selected to represent each functional areas must be dedicated to the reengineering effort 
on a full time basis. Team members’ regular job and responsibilities must be assigned for the duration 
of the project. A team redesigning a business process must include members both internal and external 
to that process. The internal members help to define the current steps and identify the value added 
activities while the external members especially customers and suppliers to the process bring creativity 
and a fresh perspective to the redesign effort. 
 
• The HEI must have adequate budget in order to implement the reengineering project especially if new 
information technologies are needed to support the project. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The methodology of research employed was through an interview with top and middle level managers of 
the HEI from various departments. In this study, a total of 30 managers were interviewed. Statistical data 
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and reports were also obtained from the HEI as a source of secondary data to complement the findings of 
the interviews.  
 
Some of the variables in this study were adapted from Davis and Mehta (1997) who proposed a 
mission/vision model with general steps for implementing BPR within business faculty. The steps include 
creating an organizational culture which incorporates teamwork in designing reengineering; setting up a 
steering committee; completing feasibility studies; writing the mission; identifying and training the work 
design; creating awareness in the organization; analyzing the work; selecting and training the employees 
and training leaders in their new leadership roles. 
 
The interview was divided into two sections namely the core business processes and barriers during the 
implementation stage. In the first section, managers were asked on the management system prior to 
restructuring; vision, mission and strategic direction; mapping of core business processes; financial 
performance; corporate structure; organizational structure of the HEI; reorganization of learning centers; 
courses offered; human resource policies and customers feedback. 
 
In the second section, the interviewees were asked on the critical success factors and barriers they faced 
during the implementation of the BPR. A list of variables was given to the respondents and they were asked 
to indicate their level of agreement based on Likert-scale, with the following representation of level of 
agreement; ‘1’ indicates ‘strongly agree’; ‘2’ indicates ‘agree’; ‘3’ indicates ‘neutral’; ‘4’ indicates 
‘disagree’ and ‘5’ indicates ‘strongly disagree’. 
 
The other related information was obtained from a report from the HEI. 
 
 
Management System Prior to Restructuring 
 
Prior to restructuring, there were 13 departments in existence, one being the academic. Each department 
operated independently with little co-ordination between them. Within the academic department itself, 
various program courses operated independently of the other course programs. Without documented 
procedures as guidelines, each course program claimed that their system was the best and did not want to 
co-operate with the other course programs. In addition to that, the modus operandi of each program 
coordinator differed from the others. As a result, some course programs were seen to be efficient and some 
lacked such initiatives. 
 
Each lecturer within a course program had different practices and the approach to the delivery and the use 
of lecture material depended on the individual lecturer. This approach towards teaching was very arbitrary 
and differed in style and administration from one lecturer to another.  Hence, communication among and 
within course programs was chaotic and lacked consistency in its operation. 
 
Another feature that was in existence related to the unclear nature of job responsibilities. It was not 
mandatory to have clear job responsibilities. As a result, task overlapped without clear task objectives and 
without measure of achievements. There were cases where two members of staff were carrying duties 
similar in nature in one department. In addition to this, there were also members of staff executing various 
duties not specific to their department. Staff secondment and redundancy of workforce were rampant and 
this created confusion among members of staff in respect to their objectives and direction. 
 
Other features of the internal system in evidence were that there were no standard methods of record 
maintenance and filing systems in most departments. The traceability of records was difficult especially 
when these records were required by other departments for cross-referencing. Another feature related to the 
achievement of the targets set for lecturers, which were not uniform. The very ambitious lecturers would 
normally set high targets while the less ambitious lecturers would not set targets or set them at a very low 
level. As such, in many cases the less ambitious lecturers were not committed and did not show interest in 
student performances. Lecturers were evaluated based on a verbal inquiry from the students and there was 
no formalized method of evaluation where the effectiveness of a lecturer’s approach could be measured. 
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Vision, Mission and Strategic Direction 
 
Vision, mission and strategic direction were not printed prior to restructuring. All these elements were only 
informed and communicated to all staff members during an annual meeting. Written objectives were only 
circulated to the heads of departments and not to every employee. Consequently employees tended to forget 
their objectives or achievement targets and used their own goals to carry out their work. In this system it 
becomes difficult to monitor if an employee had achieved the target set and to measure the effectiveness of 
each employee in achieving the goals of the organization. 
 
After restructuring, the HEI had a more systematic and comprehensive system. Vision, mission, shared 
working values and working principles were communicated not only verbally but through a pocket sized 
written document provided to every employee. Written directions were given to each head of department to 
be placed in their respective office. These written directions were also pasted at the bulletin board at each 
learning center. Awareness campaigns were carried out to ensure that all staff members were working 
towards the same direction. 
 
 
Core Business Processes 
  
The mapping of the core business processes is as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Mapping of Core Business Processes 
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The core business processes of the HEI are divided into 6 main core processes which are product 
development; marketing; registrar activities; teaching and learning; assessment and examination and 
student activities. The objectives of all these core business processes are to fulfill customer requirements; to 
obtain customer feedback and to ensure customer satisfaction. A brief description of the core processes is 
as follows: 
 
• Core process 1: Product development includes the design and development of home programs/courses. 
The Head of Department needs to evaluate the effectiveness or conduct appraisal of the programs 
offered. At the same time the Head of Department needs to carry out market survey to ensure the 
programs offered are able to meet customer requirements. 
 
• Core process 2: Marketing involves all the marketing activities as planned in the marketing calendar. 
The Head of Department needs to conduct surveys on customer perception. Also required of this core 
process is to measure and analyze the effectiveness of the marketing activities.  
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• Core process 3: Registrar covers students’ activities such as registration; accommodation; sponsorship; 
collection of tuition fess and bad debts; sending invoices to sponsorship bodies; releasing academic 
transcripts; convocation and alumni. 
 
• Core process 4: Teaching and learning involve all processes linked to delivering knowledge to 
students. This process requires the Head of Department to utilize all the resources such as 
infrastructure; environment; lecturers; transport; library; computers and science lab to ensure the 
effectiveness of this process. 
 
• Core process 5: Assessment and examination include all academic procedures pertaining to continuous 
assessment and examination. The Head of Department needs to carry out statistical analysis on 
examination results.  
 
• Core process 6: Student activities emphasis on major students activities such as annual sports carnival; 
students election and students’ co-curriculum activities. The activities will be conducted and facilitated 
by the student council. The Head of Department needs to obtain feedback from students on the 
effectiveness of the students activities conduced by the student council. 
 
Figure 1, shows a loop among core processes 4, 5 and 6. This indicates the continual improvement 
activities will always be conducted to ensure the HEI meets the target of the organization. The continual 
improvement activities will be administered based on the measurement and analysis completed by the 
Heads of Department of these core processes. 
 
 
Financial Performance Analysis 
 
The financial performance of the HEI indicated through indices between 2000 and 2003 is provided in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Financial Performance Indices of the HEI 
 
Year 
Revenue 
Index 
 
Cost of Sales 
Index 
Gross Profit 
Index 
Operational 
Expenditure 
Index 
Net Profit 
(Loss) Index 
2000 154.47 90.93 247.68 126.68 101.27 
2001 125.06 101.53 159.57 92.04 35.18 
2002 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2003 107.01 115.23 94.94 69.72 22.19 
Note: Year 2002 was chosen as a base year 
 
The HEI was unable to sustain consistent profitability over the years since its inception in 1992 due to its 
high operating costs. A committee was established to identify the drawbacks of the operations. The 
committee members selected were all highly qualified managers and academics in business management at 
the HEI. The restructuring of the HEI was implemented after a financial review was carried out. The 
restructuring effort was implemented in the middle of 2002. The focus of the restructuring was in the areas 
of cost of sales and operating expenses. An operating plan or model was devised to rectify the situation 
with minimal loss to the HEI. After the restructuring, it was found that the HEI was able to reduce its losses 
by 78 percent and operational expenses by 30 percent. 
 
 
Corporate Structure of the Foundation Holdings 
 
The corporate structure prior to restructuring is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Corporate Structure of Foundation Holdings Prior to Restructuring 
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It was found that the activities of the HEI and that of the Agriculture subsidiary were inconsistent. The only 
reason that the HEI was supervised by the Agriculture subsidiary was because the latter generated income 
from its agricultural activities to support the infrastructure development of the HEI. The financial support 
intended for the HEI came from the Foundation and was channeled to the Agriculture subsidiary solely 
because the structure exists as such. The Agriculture subsidiary was also burdened by the uncertainties in 
the agricultural market. 
 
The objectives of the Agriculture subsidiary and the HEI were different. The HEI was seen by the 
Foundation as an alternative to open more academic opportunities hence incurring more costs while the 
goals of the Agriculture subsidiary was profit oriented. 
 
Another point to consider is that the Training Division of the HEI undertook some similar programs 
conducted by the Religious subsidiary of the Foundation. This practice created cannibalism as the student 
enrollment was now divided between the two subsidiaries. The religious subsidiary in this case conducted 
training courses besides the religious courses very much to generate income to support the religious 
courses.  
 
The establishment of a new corporate structure whereby the subsidiaries were separated and focused on its 
activities was recommended. The new structure is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Corporate Structure of the Foundation Holdings After Restructuring 
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The advantage of the new corporate structure was that the HEI would now be under the direct supervision 
of the Foundation. As a result decision-making would be more efficient and prompt. Each subsidiary had 
its activities focused with clear objectives and shared common goals. 
 
However there were some loopholes where the Foundation would have two subsidiaries related to 
education operations. The Foundation should consider, integrating both the subsidiaries and encourage a 
relocation policy whereby staff members from one subsidiary would be seconded to another when such 
need arose in order to reduce overheads and to be more cost effective. Further, in order to ensure some 
degree of effectiveness, the appointment of Board of Directors of the HEI was recommended to consist of 
the academics; corporate individuals; a certified public accountant and a representative from the 
Foundation Holdings. It was hoped that such representation would provide an avenue for inputs from the 
private sector in relation to current knowledge and skills required to be incorporated into the syllabus of the 
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courses provided by the HEI. This would enable the HEI to produce graduates who would be marketable; 
meet industry demands and cope with the challenges and the volatility of the environment.  
 
 
HEI Organizational Structure 
 
The HEI organizational structure prior to restructuring is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The Organizational Structure of the HEI Prior to Restructuring 
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The HEI organizational structure after restructuring is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: The Organizational Structure of the HEI After Restructuring 
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The new organizational structure for the HEI emulated the characteristics and consisted of units 
recommended by the Malaysian Ministry of Education on private HEI’s. The organizational structure of the 
HEI although was not as complex as the ones of the public universities in Malaysia but basically conformed 
to the main operational activities of universities. Hence the structure placed the HEI well prepared towards 
attaining university status in the future. 
 
 
Reorganization of Learning Centers 
 
The HEI had 7 learning centers located in the same area. The operating costs of each learning center are 
shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Monthly Cost Comparison of Learning Centers Before and After Restructuring   
 
Before After 
Learning 
Centers Rental (RM) 
Utility and 
Maintenance 
(RM) 
Total (RM) Rental (RM) 
Utility and 
Maintenance 
(RM) 
Total 
(RM) 
1 - 17,800 17,800 - 17,800 17,800 
2 39,000 26,000 65,000 - - - 
3 17,000 18,000 35,000 17,000 22,000 39,000 
4 - 4,000 4,000 - 6,500 6,500 
5 25,210 9,000 34,210 - - - 
6 54,800 18,000 72,800 37,600 16,500 54,100 
7 25,000 9,000 34,000 25,000 11,000 36,000 
Total 161,010 101,800 262,810 79,600 73,800 153,400 
 
It can be seen that Learning Center 5 when closed added cost savings to about 7.2 percent of the total 
operation costs of 2002. Similar savings of 3.3 percent was recorded for the part closure of Learning Center 
6. The closure of Learning Center 2 contributed a savings of 11 percent of the operating costs. The savings 
on rent and rates on the whole was about 18 percent of the operating costs. Cost savings could maximized 
if a permanent learning centers was constructed to accommodate all programs or courses under one roof. 
 
After restructuring, the HEI was found to be maximizing the capacity of all the learning centers. The 
occupancy percentage rate is shown in Table 3. Students who were studying at Learning Center 2 were 
transferred to Learning Center 6 and students from Learning Center 5 were transferred to Learning Center 
3. Indirectly the occupancy percentage for Learning Center 3 and 6 had increased by 40 percent and 59 
percent respectively. The overall use of learning centers capacity increased to 69 percent compared to its 
occupancy of 49 percent prior to restructuring.  
 
Table 3: Learning Center Occupancy Before and After Restructuring 
 
Before After 
Learning Centers Maximum 
Capacity Actual Occupation 
Maximum 
Capacity Actual Occupation 
1 400 347 (87%) 400 347 (87%) 
2 450 381 (85%) - - 
3 1,000 282 (28%) 1,000 675 (68%) 
4 400 176 (44%) 400 176 (44%) 
5 600 393 (66%) - - 
6 650 123 (19%) 650 504 (78%) 
Total 3,500 1,702 (49%) 2,450 1,702 (69%) 
 
The HEI could accommodate 1895 students at any one time. However the occupancy rate was only 41 
percent with 784 students choosing to stay in hostels. Consequently the HEI had to absorb losses due to 
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maintenance costs and servicing loans taken to establish these hostels. As part of the restructuring exercise 
it was suggested that hostels should be treated as profit centers as well. Hostels found unable to meet 
operating expenses were closed or partly closed. The occupancy rate prior to restructuring was 41 percent. 
 
The relocation of students’ accommodation from Learning Center 2 to Learning Center 6 had increased the 
occupancy rate to 68 percent (Refer Table 4). This was achieved through lower utility and rental costs. 
 
Table 4: Hostel Occupancy Before and After Restructuring 
 
Before After Hostel at 
Learning Centers Maximum Capacity Actual Occupation 
Maximum 
Capacity Actual Occupation 
1     
Dorm 122 (F) 77 (63%) 122 77 (63%) 
Link House 84 (M) 74 (88%) 84 74 (88%) 
Flat 64 (M) 20 (31%) 64 20 (31%) 
2     
Block A 140 (F) 85 (61%) - - 
Block B 322 (M) 112 (35%) - - 
4 70 (F/M) 6 (9%) 70 69 (99%) 
6     
Block B 277 (F/M) 170 277 219 (79%) 
Block C 272 (F/M) 0 -  
7 544 (F) 240 (44%) 544 325 (67%) 
Total 1,895 784 (41%) 1,151 784 (68%) 
Indicators:   M - Male Student  F - Female Student F/M - Mixed 
 
The HEI implemented the rule that sponsoring bodies should make it mandatory for students under their 
sponsorship to stay in the hostel. It was hoped that this would ensure better control of student safety and at 
same time increase the occupancy rate. 
 
 
Courses Offered 
 
In total the HEI administers 36 courses. The details are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Courses Offered at the HEI 
 
Level of Courses Offered Discipline Certificate Diploma Undergraduate Graduate Total 
Business 2 10 3 1 16 
Engineering - 8 - - 8 
Information Technology 1 1 - - 2 
Computer Science 2 3 2 - 7 
Art & Design 1 2 - - 3 
Total 6 24 5 1 36 
 
The HEI offered 12 Diploma and 2 Certificate level courses designed and owned by the college. The 5 
undergraduate courses were in collaboration with foreign universities while the rest of the courses were in 
collaboration with local institutions. 
 
After restructuring 5 of the courses were terminated, of which 2 were in collaboration with foreign 
universities. These courses were operating at below breakeven point and were heavily subsidized by other 
courses. In addition these courses were cannibalizing on other courses as they were in the same discipline 
but offered through collaborative links with other institutions. The in house courses of the HEI accounted 
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for 39 percent of the courses offered prior to restructuring. After restructuring this portion had increased to 
45 percent. Thus reducing its dependence on collaborative links and relying more on home-generated 
courses. It was expected to save heavy payouts on royalties. However this will only be evident in the next 3 
years. The immediate benefit drawn from course restructuring was that most of the courses continued to be 
offered but only offered at Learning Center 3. 
 
Consequently courses offered at Learning Center 2 and 5 prior to restructuring were transferred to Learning 
Center 6 and 3 respectively. This had resulted in maximum utilization of facilities; lecturers and support 
staff. Hence tremendous savings were achieved through reduced rental; utilities; maintenance and 
transportation. 
 
The annual savings attained from the reorganization of learning centers in rental; utilities and transportation 
would be RM 976,920, RM 336,000 and RM 96,000 respectively. Total saving was RM 1,408,920, which 
accounted for 20 percent of the operating expenses for year 2002. 
 
 
Human Resource Policies 
 
As a result of the reorganization of learning centers, on the whole there were no excess members of 
academic staff as they were easily absorbed into other programs with maximum teaching load. Prior to 
restructuring lecturers located at one learning center were not assigned to teach at other learning centers 
and were more often than not teaching below the maximum teaching hours. 
 
When Learning Center 2 and 5 ceased operations the students from Learning Center 2 were relocated at 
Learning Center 6 while students studying at Learning Center 5 were transferred to Learning Center 3. As a 
result of the reorganization of learning centers, lecturers were required to teach on various collaborative 
links and not confine their services to one collaborative link. With lecturers taking on many courses the 
need for part time lecturers were reduced tremendously. Lecturers who taught at below maximum hours 
were now required to increase their teaching load and to teach across collaborative links. 31 lecturers 
resigned in 2002 but were replaced by only 25 lecturers. In 2003, 22 lecturers resigned only 6 were 
replaced. The new human resource policy introduced required lecturers to be shared with other 
collaborative links and would have to lecture on other learning centers if their services were required. 
Hence there was no need to increase the number of academic staff. All new appointments were made on a 
need basis but without additional costs where possible. These included secondment postings, reassigning 
teaching hours so that capable lecturers can undertake management responsibilities without the need to pay 
out allowances or salary increments to compensate for new responsibilities. 
 
Academic staff salaries were statistically normally distributed. 7 percent (11 staff members) of them are 
categorized in the higher earning bracket of between RM 3000 and RM 4000 a month. These lecturers are 
also members of the Senior Management team of the HEI. Among the non-academic staff members 121 or 
78 percent of them were earning RM 500 - RM 1000 a month and constitute housekeepers; security 
officers; junior assistants and administrative assistants. 
 
The ratio of academic to non-academic staff was 1:1, indicated that for each lecturer there was one support 
staff. Generally in practice direct labor should be more than fixed labor. In this case the academic staff is 
assumed to fit into the category of direct labor in a manufacturing sector as they relate to students passes 
(output). Hence it can be seen that this deviation requires review from general management practice. 
 
Human resource policies resulted in the creation of two major category of academic employment namely 
staff employed on tenure and staff employed on a contractual basis. Lecturers who were appointed on a 
contractual basis and subject to performance review could be absorbed into the tenure status after a 
minimum of 6 months service. This way the HEI was not obliged to keep non-performing members of staff. 
Lecturers were not allowed to resign mid way through the semester. The date of resignation could only be 
effective during semester break.  
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Consequently the need to employ part time lecturers half way though the semester would not arise due to 
resignations. Tenure lecturers were required to submit a 3 months notice of their resignation to provide 
ample time for Senior Management to administer the recruitment process in order to ensure only 
sufficiently suitable staff were recruited.  
 
 
Customers Feedback 
 
Prior to restructuring, the activities of the HEI were focused on routine operational activities. Customer 
satisfaction received little attention. Surveys were not carried out on customer feedback. The realization of 
customer importance was minimal. The Management and Quality Department mainly focused on routine 
administrative work. 
 
After restructuring, the Management and Quality Department were separated. The administration of 
customer focus and feedback was undertaken by Quality Management Department. This department carried 
out surveys on the internal and external customers of the HEI regularly. 
 
As a result, shortcomings in various support departments were identified and corrective actions were taken 
immediately. Furthermore the findings also provided valuable information for management to design 
preventive measures to eliminate root causes of the shortcomings. 
 
Customer feedback had proven to be an important source of information towards continuous improvement 
of the activities; processes and performance of the functional departments. 
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
BPR theory suggests that companies will achieve the greatest success if they are customer-focused and 
market-driven in their external relations and process-focused and team-oriented in their internal operations. 
The initial activities of the HEI focused on four major components: a greater focus on the customers of the 
organization (both internal and external); a fundamental rethinking of the processes in the organization that 
led to improvements in productivity; a structural organization, typically breaking functional hierarchies into 
cross functional teams and new information and measurements systems.  
 
The HEI under this study could be categorized as Improvement-Driven Organization where: 
 
• Improvement = change in the right direction 
• Driven = compelled to improve 
• Organization = the HEI and its employees; suppliers; customers and stakeholders. 
 
Figure 6 shows the dynamics of an improvement-driven organization with three drivers, mainly the leader; 
the processes and improvement which are the basis for establishing the corporate objective of such an 
organization. 
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Figure 6: Dynamics of an Improvement-Driven Organization 
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Source: Carr and Johansson (1995) 
 
The leader drives the organization by assigning the necessary resources to assess the current environment.  
At the same time the leader communicates the vision plan for the future both short and long term. The 
processes need to be continuously improved either through quick fix track or reengineering track or gradual 
improvement track. Quick fix track means simplifying the existing procedures before implementing it. 
While reengineering track involves innovation and creativity either by creating new procedures or by 
referring to the external best practices as a guideline while gradual improvement track means identifying 
root causes and proposing some improvement procedures. All of these tracks definitely need to be 
continuously monitored. 
 
When the HEI practiced cross-functional teams, it was indirectly increasing the communication across each 
of the function that was involved in the process. The experience curve in Figure 7 shows how internal 
process improvement was effectively combined with external benchmarking, where the number of defects 
and cost involved was reduced. The internal process improvement teams accelerated the movement of the 
HEI down the curve. The external benchmarking helped the HEI to adopt an entirely new process 
technology and shift the experience curve downward. The operational cost of the HEI was reduced 
tremendously when it adopted this strategy.  
 
Figure 7: Experience Curve Before and After Process Reengineering 
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Source: Sethi and King (1998) 
 
Besides reducing operational cost, the HEI also practiced empowerment in the organization by identifying 
catalysts or change agents at all levels in the organization and involved them in the exercise or created 
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structures which gave them the authority to make decisions; implement changes; question the sacred cows 
and innovate. 
 
The analysis of the case shows that the HEI concentrated on means to increase productivity, provide higher 
level of services and responsiveness and at the same time reduce costs. The strategy chosen improved cycle 
time; efficiency; cost; quality; service; flexibility and capability of the HEI. At the same time it also helped 
to enhance customer loyalty and increase company profitability. 
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